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THE MODAL LOGIC OF ARITHMETIC POTENTIALISM AND
THE UNIVERSAL ALGORITHM
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS
Abstract. I investigate the modal commitments of various conceptions of
the philosophy of arithmetic potentialism. Specifically, I consider the natural
potentialist systems arising from the models of arithmetic under their natural
extension concepts, such as end-extensions, arbitrary extensions, conservative
extensions and more. In these potentialist systems, I show, the propositional
modal assertions that are valid with respect to all arithmetic assertions with
parameters are exactly the assertions of S4. With respect to sentences, how-
ever, the validities of a model lie between S4 and S5, and these bounds are
sharp in that there are models realizing both endpoints. For a model of arith-
metic to validate S5 is precisely to fulfill the arithmetic maximality principle,
which asserts that every possibly necessary statement is already true, and these
models are equivalently characterized as those satisfying a maximal Σ1 the-
ory. The main S4 analysis makes fundamental use of the universal algorithm,
of which this article provides a simplified, self-contained account. The pa-
per concludes with a discussion of how the philosophical differences of several
fundamentally different potentialist attitudes—linear inevitability, convergent
potentialism and radical branching possibility—are expressed by their corre-
sponding potentialist modal validities.
1. Introduction
Consider the models of arithmetic M under the modalities arising from their
various natural extension concepts, viewing the result in each case as a potentialist
system, a Kripke model of possible arithmetic worlds. The end-extension modality,
for example, is defined by the operators:
M |= ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in some end-extension of M, and
M |= ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in all end-extensions of M.
The arbitrary-extension modality, in contrast, is defined by:
M |= ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in some extension of M, and
M |= ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in all extensions of M.
Other natural extension modalities include n and n, which restrict the previous
to Σn-elementary extensions, and in section 6 we shall consider the conservative
end-extension modality , the computably saturated end-extension modality ,
and many others.
Thanks to Rasmus Blanck, Ali Enayat, Victoria Gitman, Roman Kossak, Volodya Shavrukov,
and Albert Visser for insightful comments and helpful discussions. Commentary concerning this ar-
ticle can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/arithmetic-potentialism-and-the-universal-algorithm.
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Ultimately, we shall consider a large variety of natural extension modalities in
this article:
Each extension concept for the models of arithmetic—a way of relating some mod-
els of arithmetic to other larger models—gives rise to a corresponding extension
modality and its associated potentialist system of arithmetic.
The goal is to analyze the precise modal validities exhibited by these various
natural potentialist systems. For generality, let us work in the class of all models of
PA+, an arbitrary fixed consistent c.e. extension of PA, with the central case being
PA itself, and I shall use the phrase model of arithmetic to mean a model of this
base theory PA+. Since the domains of the models are inflationary with respect to
these various extensions, these are potentialist systems in the sense of [HL17]. In
that article, Linnebo and I had provided a general model-theoretic framework for
potentialism, using it to analyze the precise modal commitments of various kinds of
set-theoretic potentialism, and the project here should be seen as an arithmetic ana-
logue. Following this article, Woodin and I carried out an analogous project [HW17]
for top-extensional potentialism in set theory.
A main result, proved in section 5, will be the following.
Main Theorem. With respect to the potentialist system consisting of the models
of PA+ under the end-extension modality :
(1) The potentialist validities of any M |= PA+, with respect to arithmetic as-
sertions with parameters from M and indeed one specific parameter suffices,
are exactly the modal assertions of S4.
(2) The potentialist validities of any M |= PA+, with respect to arithmetic
sentences, is a modal theory containing S4 and contained in S5.
(3) Both of the bounds in (2) are sharp: there are models validating exactly S4
and others validating exactly S5 for sentences.
I shall prove similar results for the other modalities, including , , n, n, ,
and sections 5 and 6 have various further sharper results, including an analysis
of the arithmetic maximality principle for these various extension concepts.
This theorem in part refines an earlier independent result of Volodya Shavrukov
(appearing in Visser’s overview of interpretability logic [Vis98, theorem 16, credited
to Shavrukov]), showing that the propositional modal assertions valid for sentential
substitutions simultaneously in all models of arithmetic is S4. Thus, there is a
certain overlap of themes and ideas between this paper and prior work of Visser and
Shavrukov on the modal logic of interpretability, and also with work of Berarducci,
Blanck, Enayat, Japaridze, Shavrukov, Visser and Woodin in connection with the
universal algorithm, as explained in section 3.
To explain the terminology of the theorem, let me define that a modal assertion
ϕ(p0, . . . , pn), with propositional variables pi, is valid at a world M for a family of
assertions, if M |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) for any substitution of the propositional variables
by those assertions pi 7→ ψi. Following [HL17], let us denote by Val(M,L) the
collection of propositional modal validities of a world M with respect to assertions
in a language L. I shall at times use a subscript, as in Val (M,L), to indicate
which modality and accessibility relation is intended.
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Let me illustrate the idea by showing that the modal assertions of S4 are valid
in every model of arithmetic under the end-extension modality . This is an ele-
mentary exercise in modal reasoning, which I encourage the reader to undertake.
Every model of arithmetic M obeys (ϕ→ ψ)→ ( ϕ→ ψ), since if an implica-
tion ϕ → ψ holds in every end-extension of M and also the hypothesis ϕ, then so
does the conclusion ψ. Similarly, every model obeys ϕ→ ϕ, since every model is
an end-extension of itself. Every model obeys ϕ → ϕ, since if ϕ holds in all
end-extensions, then ϕ also holds in all end-extensions, because an end-extension
of an end-extension is an end-extension. And every model obeys the duality axiom
¬ ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ, since ϕ fails to hold in all end-extensions just in case ¬ϕ holds in
some end-extension. Since these modal statements are precisely the axioms of S4,
to be closed under modus ponens and necessitation, one concludes that S4 is valid.
It is a more severe requirement on a modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn), of course, for
it to be valid with respect to a larger collection of substitution instances; and so in
particular, a modal assertion might be valid with respect to sentential substitutions,
but not valid with respect to all substitutions by formulas with parameters. For
example, the main theorem shows that some models validate S5 for sentences, but
only S4 for arithmetic assertions with parameters.
It follows from the main theorem that the standard model N validates exactly
S4 for sentential substitutions, since all parameters are absolutely definable in the
standard model. Meanwhile, the models whose sentential validities are S5 are
precisely the models of what I call the arithmetic maximality principle, which holds
in a model of arithmetic M when M |= σ → σ for every arithmetic sentence σ.
In other words, if a sentence σ could become true in some end-extension of M in
such a way that it remains true in all further end-extensions, then it was already
true in M . This holds, I prove in theorem 33, in precisely the models of arithmetic
whose Σ1 theory is a maximal consistent Σ1 extension of the base theory PA
+.
Let me clarify the various formal languages that will be used in this work.
(1) The language of arithmetic L = {+, ·, 0, 1, <} is the usual language in
which for example the theory PA is expressed, with expressions such as
∀x∃y (x = y + y) ∨ (x = (y + y) + 1).
(2) The language of propositional logic, in contrast, denoted P , has no arith-
metic or quantifiers, but is simply the closure of propositional variables p,
q, r and so on under Boolean logical connectives, with expressions such as
¬p ∨ (p→ q).
(3) The language of propositional modal logic, denoted P , also allows the use
of the modal operators , , having expressions such as
p→ (p ∧ ¬p).
(4) The (partial) potentialist language of arithmetic, denoted (L), is the clo-
sure of the language of arithmetic L under the modal operators , and
under the Boolean connectives. Thus, every (L) assertion is a sub-
stitution instance ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) of a propositional modal logic assertion
ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) ∈ P by arithmetic assertions ψi ∈ L, such as in the case
Con(PA)→ [Con(PA) ∧ ¬Con(PA)] ,
which is a substitution instance of the propositional modal assertion in (3).
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(5) Finally, the (full) potentialist language of arithmetic, denoted L , allows
all the usual constructions of the language of arithmetic plus the modal
operators, as in the assertion
∀k [ Con(PAk)→ Con(PAk+1)] .
Note that in the full potentialist language of arithmetic, the modal oper-
ators can fall under the scope of a number quantifier, while this does not
occur for expressions in the partial potentialist language (L).
The paper concludes in section 7 with philosophical remarks on some fundamen-
tally different potentialist attitudes and how they are expressed in the potentialist
modal validities.
2. Extensions of models of arithmetic
For the rest of this article, let PA+ be a fixed consistent computably enumerable
theory extending PA in the language of arithmetic, defined by a fixed computable
enumeration algorithm, which can therefore be interpreted in any model of arith-
metic. Consider the potentialist systems consisting of all the models of PA+ under
the various extension relations. Let PA+k be the theory fragment consisting of the
axioms of PA+ enumerated by stage k. These assertions will have length less than
k, and so their arithmetic complexity will be less than Σk.
My argument will use the following classical result, a generalization of the fact
that PA proves Con(PAk) for every standard finite k. This fact in turn implies that
PA, if consistent, is not finitely axiomatizable, for it proves the consistency of any
of its particular finite fragments.
Theorem 1 (Mostowski’s reflection theorem [Mos52]). For any standard k, the
theory PA proves Con(Trk), where Trk is the Σk-definable collection of true Σk
assertions.
This is a theorem scheme, with a separate statement for each k. In any model of
arithmetic M |= PA, the interpretation of Trk is the set of (possibly nonstandard)
Σk statements true in M according to the universal Σk truth predicate, which is
a definable class of M . In nonstandard models, of course, this theory can differ
significantly from the Σk theory of the standard model. Note also that even Tr1
can include many statements that are independent of PA. It follows immediately
from the theorem that PA+ proves the consistency of PA+k for any standard finite
k, since PA+k will be included in Trk in any model of PA
+.
Lemma 2 (Possibility-characterization lemma). In the potentialist systems consist-
ing of the models of PA+ under end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, the following
are equivalent for any model M |= PA+ and any assertion ϕ(a) in the language of
arithmetic with parameter a ∈M .
(1) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is true in some PA+ end-extension of M .
(2) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is true in some PA+ extension of M .
(3) ϕ(a) is consistent with PA+ + tpMΣ1(a), the Σ1 type of a in M .
(4) M |= Con(PA+k + ϕ(a)) for all standard numbers k.
(5) (For M nonstandard) M |= Con(PA+k + ϕ(a)) for some nonstandard k.
This result can be seen as a version of the Orey-Ha´jek characterization of rel-
ative interpretability; an essentially similar observation is made by Blanck and
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Enayat [Bla17, theorem 6.9]. In section 6, we shall see that these statements are
also equivalent to ϕ(a), ϕ(a), and in computably saturated models, to ϕ(a),
ϕ(a), and others. In the remarks before theorem 42, we explain the analogue of
lemma 2 for the Σn-elementary modal operators n and n.
Proof. (1→ 2) Immediate, since end-extensions are extensions.
(2→ 3) Suppose that M |= ϕ(a), so that there is some extension N satisfying
PA+ + ϕ(a). Since every extension is ∆0-elementary, it follows that Σ1 statements
true in M are preserved to N , and so N satisfies every assertion in the Σ1 type of a
in M . In other words, N |= PA+ +ϕ(a) + tpMΣ1(a), and so that theory is consistent.
(3→ 4) Suppose that ϕ(a) is consistent with PA+ +tpMΣ1(a). So there is a model
N |= PA++ϕ(a)+ tpMΣ1(a), although N may not necessarily extend M . (I am using
a to refer both to the original element ofM and also to the object realizing this type
in N .) For any standard finite k, we have N |= PA+k + ϕ(a), and since these have
bounded standard-finite complexity, it follows by the Mostowski reflection theorem
that N |= Con(PA+k + ϕ(a)). So it cannot be that the original model M satisfies
¬Con(PA+k +ϕ(a)), for if it were, this would be a Σ1 assertion about a that is true
in M and therefore part of the type tpMΣ1(a), which is supposed to be true in N ,
contrary to what was just observed.
(4 ↔ 5) For nonstandard M , the forward implication follows by overspill; the
converse implication is immediate, since the statement becomes stronger as k be-
comes larger.
(4→ 1) First consider nonstandardM . IfM thinks that PA+k+ϕ(a) is consistent
for some nonstandard k, then M can complete this theory to a complete consistent
Henkin theory and form the resulting Henkin model, which will be a model of PA+
since all standard instances are included in the nonstandard theory fragment PA+k.
It will also be a model ϕ(a), since this is in the Henkin theory. Since the model is
definable in M , it follows that it will be an end-extension of M , and so PA+ +ϕ(a)
will be true in an end-extension of M . So M |= ϕ(a). In the case that M is the
standard model N, then we get full Con(PA+ + ϕ(a)), and the Henkin model again
provides the desired end-extension. 
In the case of an arithmetic sentence σ, with no parameter a, then the equivalence
of statement (3) should be taken as the assertion that σ holds in an extension of a
model M if and only if it is consistent with PA+ plus the Σ1 theory of M .
The following dual version is an immediate consequence.
Lemma 3 (Necessity-characterization lemma). In the potentialist systems consist-
ing of the models of PA+ under end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, the following
are equivalent for any model M |= PA+ and any assertion ϕ(a) in the language of
arithmetic with parameter a ∈M .
(1) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is true in all PA+ end-extensions of M .
(2) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is true in all PA+ extensions of M .
(3) PA+ + tpMΣ1(a) ⊢ ϕ(a) .
(4) M |= ¬Con(PA+k + ¬ϕ(a)) for some standard number k.
(5) M |= PA+k ⊢ ϕ(a) for some standard finite k.
I find it interesting to notice that lemma 2 shows that possibility assertions such
as ϕ or ϕ, where ϕ is arithmetic, have a ∀ character rather than ∃, because
they are each equivalent to the infinite conjunction of arithmetic assertions over
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standard k, a kind of universal statement, whereas possibility is usually thought
of for Kripke models as a kind of existential statement. The point is that model-
existence assertions in this context amount to consistency, which is a ∀ assertion.
Similarly, lemma 3 shows that all instances of necessity ϕ(a) and ϕ(a) for arith-
metic assertions ϕ(a) are caused by Σ1 witnessing assertions, namely, the existence
of a proof of ϕ(a) from PA+k inM for some standard k. Although any true Σ1 asser-
tion is necessary, example 17 shows that there are statements that are not Σ1 and
not provably equivalent to any Σ1 assertion, which can be necessary over a model
of arithmetic. The lemma shows, however, that whenever this happens, it is be-
cause they are a provable consequence of a certain Σ1 assertion that happens to be
true in the model, namely, the inconsistency assertion of (4) or the proof-existence
assertion of (5) in lemma 3.
Putting the two lemmas together, we arrive at the following.
Theorem 4. In the potentialist systems consisting of the models of PA+ under
end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, the following are equivalent for any model
M |= PA+ and any formula ϕ in the language of arithmetic with parameter a ∈M .
(1) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is end-extension possibly necessary over M .
(2) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is extension possibly necessary over M .
(3) There is a standard finite number n such that for standard finite k the
assertion Con(PA+k + ¬Con(PA
+
n + ¬ϕ(a))) is true in M .
(4) There is a standard finite number n such that for every standard finite k
the assertion Con(PA+k + “PA
+
n ⊢ ϕ(a)”) is true in M .
Proof. The numbers n and k are standard.
(1 → 2) Assume that M |= ϕ(a), where ϕ ∈ L. Since implies , this
means M |= ϕ(a). By lemma 3, since ϕ ∈ L, it follows that ϕ(a) is equivalent
to ϕ(a), and so M |= ϕ(a), as desired.
(2 → 3) If M |= ϕ(a), then there is an extension N of M with N |= ϕ(a).
By lemma 3 in N , there is some standard finite n for which N |= ¬Con(PA+n +
¬ϕ(a)). Thus, M |= ¬Con(PA+n + ¬ϕ(a)), and since this is an arithmetic as-
sertion, it follows by lemma 2 that M |= Con(PA+k + ¬Con(PA
+
n + ¬ϕ(a))) for all
standard k, establishing (3).
(3 → 1) If there is n for which all those consistency assertions are true in M ,
then by lemma 2 there is an end-extension in which ¬Con(PA+n + ¬ϕ(a)) holds,
making ϕ(a) true in all end-extensions of N by lemma 3.
(3↔ 4) Proving a statement is equivalent to inconsistency of the negated state-
ment. 
Theorem 7 shows that the equivalence of and does not continue all the way
into the full potentialist languages of arithmetic L and L , and Shavrukov and
Visser have proved (see remarks after question 8) that the equivalence can already
break down inside (L) and (L).
Theorem 5 ([Vis98, theorem 15]). In any model of arithmetic M |= PA+, the
standard cut is definable in the partial potentialist languages (L) and (L) as
follows:
k is standard if and only if Con(PA+k),
if and only if Con(PA+k).
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Consequently, in any nonstandard model of arithmetic, the induction principle fails
in the potentialist languages of arithmetic. Conversely, for formulas in the lan-
guage of arithmetic ϕ ∈ L, the assertion ϕ(a), which is equivalent to ϕ(a), is
expressible in 〈M,+, ·, 0, 1,N〉, with a predicate for the standard cut N.
Proof. If k is standard, then Con(PA+k) holds by theorem 1, and since this is true
in all extensions, we may also conclude Con(PA+k) and Con(PA
+
k). If k is non-
standard, however, then there is always an end-extension where Con(PA+k) fails,
for if it hasn’t failed yet, then PA+k is consistent in the model, and so by the
incompleteness theorem we may form a complete consistent Henkin theory extend-
ing PA+k + ¬Con(PA
+
k), which provides an end-extension model of PA
+ in which
¬Con(PA+k). So ¬ Con(PA
+
k) and hence ¬ Con(PA
+
k) in the original model.
Since the standard cut contains 0 and is closed under successor, this provides a
violation of the induction principle in the partial potentialist language.
For the converse direction, if we have a predicate for the standard cut, then
ϕ(a) and ϕ(a) are expressible, since by lemma 2, these are both equivalent to
asserting Con(PA+k + ϕ(a)) for all standard k. 
Let me generalize theorem 5 to the Σn-elementary extension relations.
Theorem 6. In any model of arithmetic M |= PA+ and for any standard n, the
standard cut ofM is definable in the partial potentialist languages n(L) and n(L)
as follows:
k is standard if and only if nCon(Trn+PA
+
k),
if and only if nCon(Trn+PA
+
k).
Proof. By Trn, I mean the Σn theory as it is defined by the universal Σn definition.
Because this theory is not c.e. when n > 1, the complexity of the consistency
assertion Con(Trn+PA
+
k) will generally rise to Πn+1. Note that reference is made
to Trn by its definition, and so this expression is in effect re-interpreted in the
extensions of M for the purpose of evaluating the modal assertion in M .
If k is standard, then we get Con(Trn+PA
+
k) in M and its extensions by the
Mostowski reflection theorem (theorem 1). Conversely, suppose that k is nonstan-
dard in M . It suffices to find a Σn-elementary end-extension of M in which the
theory Trn+PA
+
k is inconsistent. We may assume Trn+PA
+
k is consistent in M .
Let M+ be any elementary end-extension of M . In M+, let τ be the conjunction
of a (nonstandard) finite part of TrM
+
n , long enough so that every assertion of Tr
M
n
appears as a conjunct of τ . By elementarity, the theory τ + PA+k is consistent in
M+. By the incompleteness theorem in M+ applied to this theory, it follows that
τ + PA+k + ¬Con(τ + PA
+
k) is consistent in M
+. The Henkin model of this theory
as constructed in M+ provides an end-extension N |= τ + PA+k + ¬Con(τ + PA
+
k).
Since N |= τ , it follows that M ≺Σn N . Since k is nonstandard, it follows that
N |= PA+. Since τ is part of TrM
+
n and true in N , according to M
+, it follows that
the conjuncts of τ are part of TrNn , and thus N |= ¬Con(Trn+PA
+
k), as desired. 
Although lemma 2 shows that ϕ(a) is equivalent to ϕ(a) when ϕ is an as-
sertion in the language of arithmetic, let me now prove that this does not extend
to formulas ϕ
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Theorem 7. There is a model of arithmetic M |= PA+ and a sentence σ ∈ L in
the potentialist language of arithmetic, such that M |= σ ∧ ¬ σ.
Proof. The sentence σ will assert that the halting problem is in the standard system
of the model. This is expressible in either of the languages L or L , because in
these potentialist languages, we can refer to the standard cut. Specifically, take σ
to be the assertion ∃h∀e∈N (e ∈ h ↔ ∃s∈Nϕe,s(e)↓), which can be translated in
the potentialist language as
σ = ∃h∀e [ Con(PA+e)→ (e ∈ h↔ ∃s ϕe,s(e)↓ ∧ Con(PA
+
s))] .
Since the modality here is applied only to arithmetic assertions, it doesn’t matter
whether we use or , since they are equivalent for this case.
Since PA+ is a consistent c.e. theory, it has a modelM whose elementary diagram
is low and therefore does not have the halting problem 0′ in SSy(M). Therefore
also every end-extension of M will fail to have 0′ in its standard system, and so
M 6|= σ. Yet, a simple compactness argument finds an elementary extension
M ≺ N with 0′ ∈ SSy(N), and so M |= σ. 
So the two modalities and are not always identical when applied to assertions
in the full potentialist language of arithmetic. The sentence σ used in the proof of
theorem 7 is in the potentialist language L , but not in the partial language (L),
because it has modal operators appearing under the scope of number quantifiers.
Therefore it is natural to inquire exactly where the difference between and first
arises, and in particular, whether their equivalence in the language of arithmetic L
extends into the partial potentialist languages (L) and (L).
Question 8. Are ϕ(a) and ϕ(a) equivalent for ϕ in the partial potentialist
languages (L) and (L)?
This question has been answered negatively by Visser and Shavrukov. In a
reported 2016 email exchange, Visser proved the existence of separating sentences
as an abstract consequence of [Vis15], and Shavrukov proved specifically that there
is an arithmetic sentence ϕ and a model of arithmetic M satisfying both ¬ϕ
and ϕ.
Similar questions arise with essentially all of the modal operators appearing in
this article, such as , , , and all the others. Exactly how much do all these
modal operators agree? When they do disagree, at what level of complexity of
assertions do the disagreements begin to show up?
Let me generalize the idea behind the proof of theorem 7 to show that actually
arithmetic truth for the standard model is expressible in the language of extensional-
potentialist arithmetic. Indeed, even projective truth is expressible.
Theorem 9. The standard truth predicate for the standard model N is definable by
a formula in the extension-potentialist language of arithmetic L .
Proof. The standard truth predicate is unique and we can always add it to the
standard system of a suitable extension. So we can define it in the modal language
by saying Tr(x) holds if and only if x is standard and it is possible that there is a
number t coding the standard truth predicate in the standard system, and x ∈ t.
To say that a number t codes the standard truth predicate in the standard system
is expressible by a single property about t in the potentialist language, since the
standard cut is definable in the potentialist language, and so we can say that the
set coded by t obeys the Tarskian recursion for truth in the standard model. 
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Let me push the idea much harder. In fact, projective truth, which is to say,
second-order truth over the standard model of arithmetic N, is expressible in the
potentialist language of arithmetic in any model of arithmetic.
Theorem 10. Projective truth (second-order arithmetic truth) is expressible in the
potentialist language of arithmetic L . That is, for every projective formula ϕ(x),
there is a formula ϕ∗(x) ∈ L such that for any model of arithmetic M |= PA+ any
real a ∈ SSy(M), coded by a¯ ∈M , the projective assertion ϕ(a) holds if and only if
M |= ϕ∗(a¯).
In particular, the potentialist language for can express whether a given binary
relation is well-founded, whether there is a transitive model of ZFC, whether 0♯
exists, whether x♯ exists for every real x, whether ω1 is inaccessible in L, whether
there is a transitive model of ZFC with a proper class of Woodin cardinals, and
more. The full potentialist language of arithmetic for the modality, therefore, is
a very strong language, refuting what might otherwise have been a natural initial
expectation that arithmetic potentialists generally have only a comparatively weak
capacity to express arithmetic truth.
Proof. The idea is to replace quantification over the reals ∃x with potentialist num-
ber quantification ∃h, regarding the number h as coding a real in the standard
system, so that we replace further references to k ∈ x with k ∈ h, for standard k,
and replace all number quantifiers with quantifiers over the standard part of the
model, as in the previous theorem. The point is that by compactness any real can
be added to the standard system of a model by moving to a suitable extension, even
an elementary extension, and so quantifying over reals is the same as quantifying
over the possible reals that could be coded in the standard system of the model. 
The result may be connected with the main result of [Vis15], which shows that
the collection of possibly necessary sentences over PA is Π11-complete.
Question 11. How expressive is the end-extensional potentialist language L ? Can
it express arithmetic truth? Can it express projective truth? Is the halting problem
definable in every model of arithmetic by a L formula?
I am inclined to think not, and the problem is how to show that L is weaker
than L .
Question 12. Is expressible in the potentialist language L ?
In other words, in the extension-potentialist languageL , can we define a formula
equivalent to ϕ(x)?
Question 13. Is expressible from ?
Perhaps cannot define truth in the standard model, for abstract reasons. For
example, perhaps every L -definable set is computable from the oracle 0(ω), which
would mean that projective truth would not be L expressible, leading to the
conclusion that is not expressible from . I am not sure.
Similar questions arise with essentially all the other modalities considered in this
article. There is plenty of work here to occupy all of us for the future.
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3. The universal algorithm
The universal algorithm is an absolutely beautiful result due toW. HughWoodin,
upon which much of the modal analysis of this article is based. The main fact is
that there is a Turing machine program that can in principle enumerate any desired
finite sequence of numbers, if only it is run in the right universe; and furthermore,
in any model of arithmetic, one can realize any desired further extension of the
enumerated sequence by moving to a taller model of arithmetic end-extending the
previous one.
It is convenient to use an enumeration model of Turing computability, by which
we view a Turing machine program as providing a means to computably enumerate
a list of numbers. We start a program running, and it generates a list of numbers,
possibly empty, possibly finite, possibly infinite, possibly with repetition.
The history of the universal algorithm result involves several instances of inde-
pendent rediscovery of closely related or essentially similar results, alternative ar-
guments and generalizations. Woodin’s theorem appears in [Woo11], with further
results and discussion by Blanck and Enayat [BE17; Bla17], including especially
their extension of the result from countable to arbitrary models, as well as in a
series of my blog posts [Ham16; Ham17a; Ham17b], the last of which provides a
simplified proof of the theorem, which I provide below. It turns out that Volodya
Shavrukov had advanced an essentially similar argument in an email message (Feb-
ruary 16, 2012) to Ali Enayat and Albert visser, under the slogan, “On risks of
accruing assets against increasingly better advice.” Shavrukov has pointed out
that this argument is closely related to and can be seen as an instance of the con-
struction of Berarducci in [Ber90], with Woodin’s construction similarly seen (after
the fact) as a certain instance of the general Berarducci-Japaridze [Jap94] construc-
tion, a relation of part to whole, he says, “a curious instance of the part growing
more glamorous than the whole,” in light of the broad appeal of Woodin’s theorem.
Albert Visser has pointed out a similar affinity between the universal algorithm and
the classical proof-theoretic ‘exile’ argument (for example, see ‘refugee’ in [AB04]),
for the universal algorithm is allowed to succeed at stage n exactly when it finds a
particular kind of proof that this will not be the last successful stage, just as the
exile is allowed to enter a country only when he can also prove that he will eventu-
ally move on. Weaker incipient forms of the result are due to Mostowski [Mos60]
and Kripke [Kri62]. Meanwhile, in current joint work, Woodin and I have provided
a set-theoretic analogue of the result in [HW17], and in current work with myself,
Philip Welch and Kameryn Williams [HWW], we have a Σ1-definable analogue for
the constructible universe and for models of ZFC−.
Theorem 14 (Woodin). Suppose that PA+ is a consistent c.e. theory extending
PA. Then there is a Turing machine program e with the following properties.
(1) PA proves that the sequence enumerated by e is finite.
(2) For any model M of PA+ in which e enumerates a finite sequence s, possibly
nonstandard, and any t ∈ M extending s, there is an end-extension of M
to a model N |= PA+ in which e enumerates exactly t.
(3) If N |= PA+, then in the standard model N the program enumerates the
empty sequence.
(4) Consequently, if N |= PA+, then for every finite sequence s, there is a model
of PA+ in which the program enumerates exactly s.
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Proof. This is my simplified argument, which as I mentioned is essentially similar to
Shavrukov’s independent argument. I shall describe an algorithm e that enumerates
a sequence of numbers, releasing them in batches at successful stages. Stage n is
successful, if all earlier stages are successful and there is a proof in a theory fragment
PA+kn , with kn strictly smaller than all earlier ki for i < n, of a statement of the
form, “it is not the case that program e enumerates the elements of the sequence s
at stage n as its last successful stage” where s is some explicitly listed sequence of
numbers. In this case, for the first such proof that is found, the algorithm e adds
the numbers appearing in s to the sequence it is enumerating, and then continues,
trying for success in the next stage. The existence of such a program e, which
iteratively searches for such proofs about itself, follows from the Kleene recursion
theorem.
Since the numbers kn are descending as the algorithm proceeds, there can be
only finitely many successful stages and so the program will enumerate altogether
a finite sequence. So statement (1) holds.
If stage n is successful, it is because of a certain proof found using axioms from
the theory PA+kn . I claim that kn must be nonstandard. The reason is that if n
is the last successful stage and k is any standard number, then by the Mostowski
reflection theorem (theorem 1), the theory Trk is consistent, and for k ≥ 2 this
would include the assertion that e enumerated exactly the sequence that it did
enumerate in M with exactly those stages being successful. So there can be no
proof from PA+k in M that this was not the case. So every kn is nonstandard.
In particular, if PA+ is true in the standard model N, then there can be no
successful stages there. In this case, program e enumerates the empty sequence in
the standard model N, fulfilling statement (3).
For the extension property of statement (2), suppose thatM |= PA+ and program
e enumerates the (possibly nonstandard) finite sequence s inM and t is an arbitrary
finite sequence in M extending s. Let n be the first unsuccessful stage of e in M .
I may assume M is nonstandard by moving to an elementary end-extension if
necessary. Let k be any nonstandard number in M that is smaller than all ki for
i < n. Since stage n was not successful, there must not be any proof inM from PA+k
refuting the assertion that n is the last successful stage and enumerates exactly the
rest of the elements of t beyond s at stage n. In other words, M must think that it
is consistent with PA+k that e does have exactly n successful stages and enumerates
exactly the rest of t at stage n. If T is the theory asserting this, then we may build
the Henkin model of T inside M , and this model will provide an end-extension of
M to a model N that satisfies PA+k in which e enumerates exactly the sequence t
altogether. Since k is nonstandard, the theory PA+k includes the entire standard
theory PA+, and so I have found the desired extension to fulfill statement (2).
Statement (4) follows from statements (2) and (3). 
Let me now describe an alternative related algorithm, what I call the one-at-a-
time universal algorithm. Namely, program eˆ will enumerate a finite sequence of
numbers a0, a1 and so on, adding just one number at each successful stage, but only
finitely many numbers will be enumerated. The number an is defined, if the earlier
numbers have already been enumerated and there is a proof from PA+kn , with kn
strictly smaller than ki for i < n, of a statement of the form, “program eˆ does not
enumerate number a at stage n as an as its next and last number.” Since the kn are
descending, there will be only finitely many numbers enumerated. If eˆ enumerates
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s in M |= PA+, then by the Henkin theory argument, we can add any desired
next number as an in some end-extension N of M , with only that number added,
where n was the first undefined number inM . In other words, for the one-at-a-time
universal algorithm, we weaken the extension property of statement (2) to achieve
only that the sequence can be extended to add any desired next number (only one),
rather than an arbitrary sequence of numbers. Indeed, the one-at-a-time algorithm
eˆ will not have the full extension property, since once a0 is defined, then the total
length of the enumerated sequence will be bounded by k0, and so we cannot extend
to arbitrary nonstandard lengths.
Nevertheless, the one-at-a-time universal algorithm is fully general, in the sense
that we can interpret the individual numbers on its sequence each as a finite se-
quence of numbers, to be concatenated. That is, from the enumerated sequence
a0, a1, . . . , an we derive a corresponding concatenated sequence s0
a s1
a · · · a sn,
where sk is the finite sequence coded by ak. One thereby easily achieves the full
extension property for this derived sequence, since if you can always add any de-
sired individual next number an+1 to the sequence enumerated by eˆ, then you can
always add any desired (possibly nonstandard) finite sequence sn+1 to the derived
concatenated sequence. Indeed, this is exactly how the universal algorithm is de-
rived from the one-at-a-time universal algorithm. In this way, one sees that the full
extension property reduces to the one-at-a-time extension property and indeed the
two notions are essentially equivalent, in the sense that we can transform any one-
at-a-time universal sequence into a fully universal sequence. Meanwhile, in certain
circumstances the one-at-a-time sequence is simpler to consider.
Statement (3) of theorem 14 generalizes to the following.
Theorem 15. In any model M |= PA+ that thinks PA+ is Σ1-sound, the universal
algorithm e of the proof of theorem 14 enumerates the empty sequence.
Proof. If e has a successful stage in M , then it has a last successful stage n, and
this stage is successful because of a certain proof inM that e does not have exactly
that many successful stages, enumerating exactly some explicitly listed sequence s
at stage n. But of course,M does have proofs that the stages up to and including n
are successful and that it enumerates exactly the sequences that it does enumerate
at those stages, since such proofs can be constructed from the actual computation
itself inM . It follows that in M , there is a proof that stage n+1 will be successful,
even though it won’t actually be successful in M . This is a Σ1 assertion that is
provable from PA+ in M but not true in M , and so the theory is not held to be
Σ1-sound in M . 
Of course, Σ1-soundness is a strengthening of Con(PA
+), and in any model of
¬Con(PA+) the algorithm will find proofs and therefore have a successful stage.
Blanck and Enayat [BE17] prove that their version of the universal algorithm, as
well as Woodin’s original algorithm, has the property that it enumerates a nonempty
sequence if and only if ¬Con(PA+). It seems that the argument can be made to
work also for the algorithm here.
I find it interesting to consider theories such as the following. By the Go¨del-
Carnap fixed point lemma, there is a sentence σ asserting “the universal algorithm
e, relative to the theory PA+ = PA + σ, has at least one successful stage.” If this
theory were inconsistent, then there would be abundant proofs found from it in
the standard model, and so the statement would be true in the standard model,
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contrary to assumption. So the theory is consistent. But it cannot actually be true
in the standard model, since in that case the algorithm e would have to have no
successful stages in N by statement (3) of theorem 14, contrary to the presumed
truth of σ in N. Note that this theory has no models in which the algorithm is
never successful, because that is precisely what σ asserts not to occur.
Corollary 16. Let e be the universal algorithm of theorem 14. Then
(1) For any infinite sequence of natural numbers 〈a0, a1, a2, . . .〉, there is a
model M of PA+ in which program e enumerates a nonstandard finite se-
quence extending it.
(2) If M is any model of PA+ in which program e enumerates some (possibly
nonstandard) finite sequence s, and S is any M -definable infinite sequence
extending s, then there is an end-extension of M satisfying PA+ in which e
enumerates a sequence starting with S.
Proof. For statement (1), fix the sequence 〈a0, a1, a2, . . .〉. By a simple compactness
argument, there is a model M of PA+ in which program e enumerates exactly an
as its nth element.
For statement (2), if e enumerates s inM , a model of PA+, and S is anM -infinite
sequence definable inM and extending s, then apply such a compactness argument
inside M using a nonstandard fragment PA+k. (If M is the standard model, apply
statement (1) instead.) 
Corollary 16 shows the sense in which every function on the natural numbers can
become computable, and indeed, computed always by the same universal program,
if only the program is run inside the right model of arithmetic.
Observation 17. There is a statement ψ that is independent of PA and not prov-
ably equivalent to any Σ1 assertion, such that ψ can become necessarily true in all
end-extensions of a model of PA.
Proof. Let ψ be the assertion, “the sequence enumerated by the universal algo-
rithm e for the theory PA does not begin with the number 17.” This statement
is independent of PA, since theorem 14 shows that there are models in which it is
true and models in which it is false. It is a Π1 assertion, since the negation asserts
that the sequence does begin with 17, which is a Σ1 assertion; and it cannot be
provably equivalent to any Σ1 assertion, since it is true in any model where the
universal sequence is empty, but false in an end-extension where the universal algo-
rithm sequence does begin with 17. In any model M where the universal sequence
is nonempty but does not begin with 17, however, then ψ is necessary, since in no
end-extension will it begin with 17 if it didn’t already. So there are models with
M |= ψ even though ψ is not provably Σ1. 
In confirmation of my remarks after lemma 3, however, note that in the model
M where ψ holds, there is a Σ1 statement that provably implies ψ, namely, the
assertion that the universal algorithm is not empty and begins with something other
than 17.
3.1. Generalization to Σn-elementary end-extensions. I would like now to
generalize the universal algorithm argument to the case of Σn-elementary end-
extensions. I shall use this theorem when analyzing the potentialist validities of n
and n in section 6.
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Theorem 18. Suppose that PA+ is a consistent c.e. theory extending PA, and n
is any standard-finite natural number. Then there is an oracle Turing machine
program e˜ with the following properties.
(1) PA proves that the sequence enumerated by e˜, with any oracle, is finite.
(2) For any model M of PA+ in which e˜, using oracle 0(n) of M , enumerates a
finite sequence s, possibly nonstandard, and any t ∈ M extending s, there
is a Σn-elementary end-extension of M to a model N |= PA
+ in which e˜,
with oracle 0(n) of N , enumerates exactly t.
(3) If N |= PA+, then in the standard model N with the actual 0(n), the program
enumerates the empty sequence.
(4) Consequently, if N |= PA+, then for every finite sequence s, there is a model
of PA+ in which the program, using oracle 0(n) of the model, enumerates
exactly s.
Proof. I modify the proof of theorem 14 by searching for proofs not in PA+ but in
the theory Trn+PA
+, where Trn is the theory of Σn truth, which is computable
from the oracle 0(n). This theory is of course no longer computably enumerable,
but it is uniformly computable for standard n from the oracle 0(n) in any model of
arithmetic.
So the universal program e˜ here searches for a proof in Trn+PA
+
k, using the
oracle 0(n) to get access to Trn and insisting on a strictly smaller fragment k each
time (while n is fixed), that program e˜, when equipped with oracle 0(n), does not
enumerate a certain specifically listed sequence of numbers, and when found, it
enumerates that sequence anyway.
The proof of theorem 14 adapts easily to this new context. Since the theory
fragment PA+k is descending, there will be only finitely many successful stages and
so the enumerated sequence will be finite. For the extension property, suppose that
the program e˜ enumerates a sequence s in a modelM |= PA+, with stagem the first
unsuccessful stage, and that t is a finite extension of s inM . All the numbers ki for
i < m, if any, are nonstandard by the same argument as before, appealing to the
Mostowski reflection theorem. Let k be any nonstandard number smaller than ki
for i < m. Since stage m was not successful, there is no proof in M from Trn+PA
+
k
that stage m is the last successful stage, enumerating the rest of t beyond s. Thus,
this theory is consistent in M , and so by considering the Henkin theory, we get a
model N of PA+k in which e˜, using oracle 0
(n) of the new model, enumerates exactly
t. Note that because N satisfies the theory Trn as defined inM , it follows that this
is a Σn-elementary end-extensionM ≺Σn N , and so the oracle 0
(n) as defined in N
agrees with the oracle as defined in M . So the earlier part of the computation of e˜
is the same in M as in N . And since k is nonstandard, N is a model of PA+. So
we’ve found the desired extension.
So far, this gives a separate e˜ for each n, but actually, e˜ can check which n it is
using by consulting the oracle, because there is a program which on input 0 with
oracle 0(n) outputs n. So we can have a single program e˜ that works uniformly with
all n. 
Theorem 18 was observed independently by Rasmus Blanck [Bla18].
3.2. Applications of the universal algorithm. I should like briefly to explain
a few applications of the universal algorithm. It turns out that several interesting
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classical results concerning the models of arithmetic can be deduced as immediate
consequences of the universal algorithm result.
For example, the universal algorithm easily provides a infinite list of mutually
independent Π01-assertions. The existence of such a family was first proved by
Mostowski [Mos60] and independently by Kripke [Kri62]. Some logicians have em-
phasized that the universal algorithm provided in corollary 16 should be seen as a
consequence of the independent Π01-sentences.
1 To my way of thinking, however,
we should view the implication more naturally in the other direction, in light of the
easy argument from the universal algorithm to the independent Π01 sentences:
Theorem 19. There are infinitely many mutually independent Π01 sentences η0,
η1, η2, and so on. Any desired true/false pattern for these sentences is consistent
with PA.
Proof. Let ηk be the assertion that k does not appear on the universal sequence,
meaning the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm e of theorem 14 using
the theory PA. Since the universal sequence is empty in N, these statements are all
true in the standard model. Since the extension property of the universal sequence
and its consequence in corollary 16 allows us to find an end-extensionN of any given
model M that adds precisely any desired additional numbers to the sequence, we
can make the ηk become true or false in any desired combination. 
The negations of these sentences form a natural independent family of buttons.
A button in a Kripke model is a statement ρ for which ρ holds in every world.
The button is pushed in a world where ρ holds, and otherwise unpushed. A family
of buttons is independent, if in any model, any of the buttons can be pushed in a
suitable extension without pushing the others.
Theorem 20. There are infinitely many Σ01 sentences ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, and so on, which
form an independent family of buttons for the models of PA under end-extension,
unpushed in the standard model. Indeed, for any M |= PA and any I ⊆ N coded
in M , there is an end-extension N of M such that N |= ρk for all k ∈ I, and
otherwise the truth values of ρi are unchanged from M to N for i /∈ I.
Proof. Let ρk be the assertion that k appears on the universal finite sequence. In
the standard model, no numbers appear on that sequence, and in a suitable end-
extension, any number or coded set of numbers can be added without adding any
others. 
Next, consider the case of Orey sentences [Ore61]. An Orey sentence is a sentence
σ in the language of arithmetic, such that every model of PA has end-extensions
where σ is true and others where σ is false. In other words, an Orey sentence is
a switch in the Kripke model consisting of the models of PA under end-extension,
a sentence σ for which σ and ¬σ are true in every model of PA. A switch in
a Kripke model is a statement that can be turned on and off from any world by
moving to a suitable accessible world.
The universal algorithm easily provides numerous Orey sentences and indeed
infinitely many independent Orey sentences. See also [Bla17, corollary 7.11].
1For example, see the comments on [Ham16].
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Theorem 21. There is an infinite list of mutually independent Orey sentences, or
switches, in the language of arithmetic. That is, there are sentences σ0, σ1, σ2, and
so on, such that for any model of arithmetic M |= PA+ and any desired pattern of
truth for any finitely many of those sentences, there is an end-extension N |= PA+
in which that pattern of truth is realized. Indeed, for any I ⊆ N in the standard
system of M , there is an end-extension N of M such that N |= σk for exactly k ∈ I.
Proof. Let σk assert simply that the k
th binary digit of the last number on the
sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm is 1. This is a Σ2 assertion, with
the main cause of complexity being that one must assert that one has the last
number on the universal sequence. Since theorem 14 allows us to arrange in an end-
extension that any desired number appears as the last number on the sequence, we
can therefore arrange any particular desired pattern for finitely many of its binary
digits. Similarly, for any set I ⊆ N coded in the model, we can arrange in some
end-extension that the binary digits of the last number on the universal sequence
conform with I, thereby ensuring that σk holds for exactly the k in I, as desired. 
We may similarly use the universal sequence to derive the “flexible” formula
result of Kripke [Kri62]. This was also observed by Rasmus Blanck [Bla18]. Here,
I also achieve a uniform version of the result in statement (2).
Theorem 22.
(1) For every n ≥ 2, there is a Σn formula σ(x) such that for any model of
arithmetic M and any Σn formula φ(x), there is an end-extension N of M
such that N |= ∀xσ(x)↔ φ(x).
(2) Indeed, there is a computable sequence of formulas σn(x) for n ≥ 2, with
σn having complexity Σn, such that for any model of arithmetic M and any
sequence of formulas φn coded in M , with φn of complexity Σn, there is an
end-extension N of M with N |= ∀xσn(x)↔ φn(x) for all n ≥ 2.
Proof. For statement (1), let σ(x) = Φn(k, x), where k is the last element of the
universal finite sequence and Φn(k, x) is a fixed universal Σn formula, meaning that
every Σn formula arises as a section of it for some fixed k. The assertion σ(x) as
complexity Σn, if n ≥ 2, since σ(x) ↔ ∃kΦn(k, x) ∧ “k is the final element of the
universal sequence.” Since we can arrange that the final element of the universal
sequence is any desired k in a suitable end-extension N of M , we can make σ(x)
agree with any desired Σn formula.
For the uniform result, simply let σn(x) = Φn(kn, x), where kn is the n
th element
of the finite sequence added at the last successful stage of the universal sequence.
Since we can find an end-extension where the final stage of the universal sequence
adds any desired coded sequence, we can arrange that it picks out the indices of
the formulas φn, thereby obtaining the uniform flexibility property as desired. 
Similar arguments extend these results to the case of Σn-elementary extensions.
See also [Bla17, theorem 7.21].
Theorem 23.
(1) For any n, there is an infinite list of independent buttons for Σn-elementary
end-extensions of models of arithmetic. That is, there are statements ρ0,
ρ1, ρ2, and so on, of complexity Σn+1 in the language of arithmetic, such
that for any M |= PA and any I ⊆ N coded in M , there is an end-extension
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N of M with N |= ρk for all k ∈ I and otherwise the truth values of ρi are
unchanged from M to N .
(2) For any n, there is an infinite list of independent switches for Σn-elementary
end-extensions of models of arithmetic. That is, there are sentences σ0,
σ1, σ2, and so on, of complexity Σn+2 in the language of arithmetic, such
that for any model of arithmetic M |= PA+ and any desired pattern of truth
I ⊆ N in the standard system of M , there is a Σn-elementary end-extension
M ≺Σn N |= PA
+ in which that pattern of truth is realized: N |= σk pre-
cisely for k ∈ I.
(3) For any n and any m ≥ n+2, there is a ‘flexible’ Σm formula σ(x), one for
which for every model of arithmetic M |= PA+ and any Σm formula φ(x),
there is a Σn-elementary end-extension N for which N |= ∀xσ(x)↔ φ(x).
Proof. For statement (1), let ρk be the assertion that k appears on the universal
finite sequence enumerated by the algorithm e˜ of theorem 18, using oracle 0(n).
This is a Σ0n+1 assertion: one asserts that there is a computation, using the correct
oracle, showing a stage at which k appears on the sequence. Since the sequence
is empty in the standard model, these statements are all false there, and they
are possibly necessary with respect to n, since once k appears on the sequence,
it remains on the sequence in all further Σn-elementary end-extensions. Since any
specific number can be added to the sequence, and indeed any coded set of numbers,
with no others, these form an independent family of buttons.
For statement (2), let σk be the assertion that the k
th binary digit of the last
number enumerated by algorithm e˜ of theorem 18, using oracle 0(n), is one. The
complexity of this assertion is Σn+2. Since theorem 18 shows that we can ar-
range that this last number is whichever number we want in a Σn-elementary end-
extension, we can therefore arrange the pattern of truth for the σk to be as desired,
for any pattern I coded in M .
For statement (3), simply adapt the proof of theorem 22. Let σ(x) = Φm(k, x),
where k is the final element of the universal Σn-sequence and argue as before, but
with Σn-elementary end-extensions. 
One can adapt statement (1) to models of PA+, if one allows the buttons to
have parameters, and indeed, the only parameter needed would be the length u of
the universal sequence in a given base model of PA+, for then one takes ρn as the
assertion that n appears on the sequence after u. If N |= PA+, then no parameters
are needed, and in any case, no parameters are needed in the switches σk.
The following theorem follows from a classical result due to Wilkie [Wil75].
Theorem 24. For every model M |= PA+, there is a diophantine equation in M
with no solutions in M , but which does have a solution in some end-extension of
M to N |= PA+.
Proof. Let n be any (possibly nonstandard) number in M , such that stage n of the
universal algorithm is not successful in M . There is an end-extension N of M in
which this stage is successful, and this is a Σ1 assertion about n that is true in N ,
but not in M . This assertion corresponds to a diophantine equation in M with no
solution in M , but with a solution in N . 
One can view the theorem as asserting alternatively that no model of arithmetic
has a maximal Σ1 diagram: for every modelM |= PA
+, there are new Σ1 assertions,
18 JOEL DAVID HAMKINS
about parameters inM , that can become true in an end-extension ofM . Meanwhile,
note that the use of parameters in the previous argument is required, since by the
argument of theorem 33, some models of arithmetic have a maximal Σ1 theory, as
opposed to its Σ1 diagram.
A similar argument works for Σn-elementary extensions.
Theorem 25. No model of arithmetic M |= PA has a maximal Σn+1-diagram. For
every model M and every natural number n, there is a Σn+1 statement ϕ(m) that
is not true in M , but becomes true in a Σn-elementary end-extension of M .
Proof. Let m be the first unsuccessful stage of the universal algorithm eˆ of the-
orem 18, used with oracle 0(n) in M . Let σ be the statement that stage m is
successful for this algorithm. This is a statement about m with complexity Σn+1,
which is not true in M , but by the extension property of theorem 18, it becomes
true in some Σn-elementary end-extension N of M . 
The use of parameters in this result also is required, in light of theorem 42
4. Some background on modal logic and potentialism
The modal validities of a potentialist system, or indeed any Kripke model of
possible worlds, can be fruitfully analyzed by identifying the presence of certain
kinds of control statements, such as buttons, switches, ratchets and railyards. A
general account is given in [HLL15], with numerous examples and applications
provided in [HL08; HL17]. I introduce railway switches and the railyard terminology
in this article. See also the approach to the modal logic of submodels in [SS16; SS18].
Let me review some of the basics here, following [HL17]. A potentialist system is
a Kripke model of first-order structures in a common language, whose accessibility
relation refines the substructure relation, so that if world M accesses world N ,
then M is a substructure of N . Here, I am concerned with the potentialist systems
consisting of the models of PA or of PA+ under the various natural accessibility
relations: extension, end-extension, Σn-elementary extension and so on.
In any potentialist system M, an assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) in the propositional
modal language P , with propositional variables pi, is valid at a world M for a
collection S of assertions, if M |= ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) for every possible substitution
pi 7→ ψi of those propositional variables by assertions ψi ∈ S. The validity concept
makes sense for assertions ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) in the propositional potentialist language
L (p0, . . . , pn), equipping L with propositional variables, although it is common
to focus on the propositional modal language P , where the resulting modal theory
might be one of the well-known theories.
As I mentioned in the introduction, the modal theory S4 is obtained from the
axioms (K) (p → q) → ( p → q), (S) p → p, (4) p → p and (Duality)
¬ p↔ ¬p, by closing under necessitation, tautologies and modus ponens. This
modal theory, as noted there for the end-extension relation, is easily seen to be
valid in every potentialist system with respect to any collection of assertions. It
is also easy to see that the converse Barcan formula ∀x p → ∀x p is valid in all
potentialist systems, having substitution instances
∀xψ(x)→ ∀x ψ(x).
The modal theory S4.2 arises by augmenting S4 with the axiom (.2) p→ p,
which is valid in any Kripke model whose accessibility relation is directed. The
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modal theory S4.3 arises by including the axiom (.3) ( p ∧ q) → [(p ∧ q) ∨
(q ∧ p)], which is valid in any linearly ordered frame. The modal theory S5 arises
by augmenting S4 with the axiom (5) p→ p.
Modal logicians are familiar with the elementary fact that S5 is valid in a Kripke
frame F , meaning that it is valid in all Kripke models having F as its underlying
accessibility relation, if and only if F is an equivalence relation.
But I should like to emphasize that potentialism is not really about this kind
of frame semantics, since we are studying natural Kripke models, such as those
arising from the models of arithmetic, and they come along with their accessibility
relations, such as they are; we shall not be constructing other Kripke models upon
those same frames. It can definitely happen that a Kripke model validates S5,
without its frame being an equivalence relation. For example, this is true in the
potentialist system consisting of all extensions of a fixed model of the arithmetic
maximality principle.
For the potentialist systems under consideration in this article, it is generally
easy to observe that a given modal theory is valid, in the systems in which it is
valid. In this sense, lower bounds are cheaply found. Meanwhile, what is usually
much more difficult is to establish upper bounds on the modal validities of a system.
For example, in the main theorem of this article, I will show that the validities of
arithmetic potentialism are exactly S4. It was an easy exercise to show that S4
is valid; what is much harder is to show that no modal assertion outside S4 is
valid. And similar issues with the upper bounds arise in essentially all the results
of section 5.
Regarding upper bounds on the modal validities, a principal advance of my work
with Benedikt Lo¨we [HL08], further developed in [HLL15] and used in [HL17], was
the observation that one can often place upper bounds on the modal validities
of a system by observing that it admits certain kinds of easily-understood control
statements, such as switches, buttons, ratchets and railyards. Because these control
statements concern only the worlds in the potentialist system and are stated in the
object language L, rather than in the modal language, in practice one can often
thereby determine the modal validities of a system by using expertise only in the
theory of those structures, rather than expertise in modal logic.
A statement σ is a switch in a Kripke model W , if σ and ¬σ are true at
every world of W . A collection of switches σi is independent, if every world can
access another world realizing any desired finite on/off pattern for those switches.
Theorem 26. If W is Kripke model and world W admits arbitrarily large finite
collections of independent switches, then the propositional modal assertions valid at
W are contained in the modal theory S5, with respect to the language in which the
switches are expressed.
Proof. This idea goes back to [HL08] (see also [HLL15]), and it is proved explicitly
in [HL17, theorem 3]. For completeness, let me review the essential idea. If a
statement ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) is not part of S5, then it fails in some finite propositional
Kripke model M whose underlying frame is the complete relation, where all worlds
access all others, and each world w ∈ M gives truth values to the propositional
variables pi. By duplicating worlds, if necessary, I may assume that there are
2m worlds in M . Let σi be a family of m independent switches in W . For each
t < 2m, let Φt assert that the pattern of switches conforms with the binary digits
of t. This provides a partition of the worlds of W into 2m classes, corresponding
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Figure 1. A cluster of mutually accessible worlds
to the worlds of M . Next, for each propositional variable p appearing in ϕ, let
ψp =
∨
{Φt | (M, t) |= p }. This statement is true at a world W in W if and only
if W corresponds to a world t in M at which p holds. By induction, one can now
establish that
W |=W φ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn) ⇐⇒ (M, t) |= φ(p0, . . . , pn),
whenever W is a world in W corresponding to node t in M , which is to say that
W |= Φt. In this way, truth in the propositional Kripke model M is simulated in
the Kripke model W . In particular, since ϕ failed at a world of M , it follows that
ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn) fails at a world of W , and so ϕ is not valid in W . So the modal
validities of W are contained within S5. 
In practice, another convenient way to handle independent switches is with the
concept of a dial, which is a sequence of statements d0, . . . , dn, such that every
world satisfies exactly one of the statements and every world can access a world in
which any desired one of the dial statements is true. So from any world, you can
set the dial to any value that you like, by moving to a suitable accessible world.
By considering the binary digits of the dial indices, it is not difficult to see that a
Kripke model W admits arbitrarily large finite collections of independent switches
if and only if it admits arbitrarily large finite dials (see [HL17, theorem 4]). We
therefore conclude:
Theorem 27. If W is Kripke model and world W admits arbitrarily large dials,
then the propositional modal assertions valid atW are contained in the modal theory
S5, with respect to the language in which the dials are expressed.
Further such connections between modal logics and control statements are pro-
vided in [HLL15]. For example, if a potentialist system admits arbitrarily large
families of independent buttons and switches, then the modal validities are con-
tained within S4.2; if the system admits a long ratchet, then the validities are
contained within S4.3; if it admits arbitrarily large independent families of weak
buttons and switches, then the validities are contained within S4.tBA; and so on
with other instances.
Let me now introduce and consider here the concept of a railway switch, which
is a statement r such that r and ¬r at a world where it is not yet switched,
but becomes switched when r or ¬r holds. The train goes one way or the other,
but afterwards, it is too late to change tracks.
More generally, a railyard is an assemblage of such railway switches. Specifically,
if W is a Kripke model of possible worlds and T is a finite pre-tree, such as the one
pictured figure 2, then a railyard labeling for T , or a T -labeling in the terminology
of [HLL15], based at world W is an assignment t 7→ rt of the nodes of the tree
t ∈ T to assertions rt in the language of the worlds of W , such that every world of
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W satisfies exactly one of the statements rt, the original world W satisfies rt0 for
an initial node t0 of the tree, and whenever any rt is true in a world U ∈ W , then
U |= rs if and only if t ≤ s in T . In other words, the assertions rt partition the
worlds of W in such a way that makes possibility in W look the same as in T . In a
sense, the finite pre-tree T is realized as a quotient of the Kripke model W , which
could have many more worlds or even infinitely many, as it does for the cases in
which we are interested.
The existence of sufficient railyard labelings for a potentialist system allows us
to conclude that its validities are exactly S4.
Theorem 28. Suppose that W is a potentialist system that admits a railyard la-
beling for every finite pre-tree T—and it suffices to handle only pre-trees with all
clusters the same size and all branching clusters having the same degree—then the
potentialist validities of W are exactly S4, with respect to the language in which the
labeling assertions are expressed.
Proof. Note first that it is easy to see that S4 is valid in any potentialist system,
since the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive (see also [HL17, theorem 2]).
The converse result, that only S4 is valid, follows from the railyard labelings as an
instance of [HLL15, lemma 9] and the related general analysis there. Specifically,
if a propositional modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) with propositional variables pi is
not in S4, then there is a propositional Kripke model M , whose underlying frame
is a finite pre-tree T , in which ϕ fails, since this collection of frames is complete
for S4. Each world w ∈ M gives truth values to the propositional variables pi. By
duplicating worlds if necessary, we may assume that all the clusters of T have the
same size and all branching clusters branch with the same degree. Let t 7→ rt be the
railyard labeling of T for W . For each propositional variable p appearing in ϕ, let
ψp =
∨
{ rt | (M, t) |= p }, which is true in W at exactly the worlds corresponding
to nodes in the pre-tree for which p is true in M . One may now prove by induction
on formulas φ in propositional modal logic that
W |=W φ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn) ⇐⇒ (M, t) |= φ(p0, . . . , pn),
whenever W is a world in W corresponding to node t in M , which is to say that
W |= rt. In this way, truth in the propositional Kripke model M is simulated in
the potentialist system W . In particular, since ϕ failed at a world of M , it follows
that ϕ(ψp0 , . . . , ψpn) fails at a world of W , and so ϕ is not valid in W . 
5. The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism
I am now ready to prove the main results of this article. Recall that PA+ is a
fixed consistent c.e. extension of PA. Let us begin with an easy observation that
sets the overall bounds.
Theorem 29. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA+ under
end-extension, the potentialist validities of any model M , with respect to assertions
in the language of arithmetic L or any extension of it L+, contain S4 and are
contained in S5.
S4 ⊆ Val (M,L+) ⊆ Val (M,L) ⊆ S5
Proof. The modal theory S4 is valid generally in every potentialist system, as we
have noted. For the upper bound, theorem 21 provides an infinite family of inde-
pendent switches, which can be turned on and off so as to realize any desired finite
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pattern in an end-extension. It follows by theorem 26 that the modal validities of
any model are contained within S5. 
Theorem 30. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA+ under
end-extension, if M is a model in which the universal algorithm enumerates the
empty sequence, then the potentialist validities of M , with respect to sentences in
the language of arithmetic, are exactly the assertions of S4.
S4 = Val (M,L) ( S5
Proof. By theorem 28, it suffices to provide railyard labelings for any finite pre-tree.
Consider such a pre-tree T , such as the one pictured below in figure 2. Each world
in a cluster can access all the other worlds in that cluster and any world in any
higher cluster in the tree.
Figure 2. A finite pre-tree T
To produce the railyard labeling, assign each node t in the tree T to an assertion
rt in the language of arithmetic that makes a certain specific claim about the
behavior of the universal algorithm e. Specifically, let k be such that this tree is
at most k-branching, and let m be such that all the clusters have size at most m.
Consider the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm e. It enumerates a
finite list of numbers, and from that list we produce the subsequence of numbers
consisting of those numbers less than k, which we interpret as a way of climbing
the tree, a way of successively choosing amongst the branching nodes in T , so as to
arrive at a particular cluster of T (ignore any additional numbers, if there are too
many), plus the last number on the universal sequence that is k or larger (default to
k, if there is none). By considering this final number modulo m, we may interpret
it as picking a particular node in the cluster at which we arrived (and simply group
together some of the residues if the cluster has fewer than m nodes). In this way,
we can assign to each node t of the pre-tree T a statement rt about the nature of
the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm, in such a way that a world
W satisfying rt will satisfy rs just in case t ≤ s in T . The reason is that by
theorem 14, any sequence in any such W can be extended by any desired finite
sequence, and we can add to the given sequence as it is computed in W so as to
specify in an extension U that we climb to and arrive at any desired node s in the
tree. Any model M in which the universal sequence is empty will correspond to
an initial node of the tree. Thus, the universal algorithm provides a labeling of
any finite pre-tree, and so the potentialist modal validities of W , with respect to
sentences in the language of set theory, is exactly S4. 
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In particular, if PA+ is true in the standard model N, as in the central case where
PA+ is simply PA itself, then the modal validities of N are exactly S4 for sentences.
Theorem 31. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA+ under
end-extension, the potentialist validities of any model M |= PA+, with respect to
assertions in the language of arithmetic allowing parameters from M , are exactly
the assertions of S4. Indeed, for every model M , there is a single parameter u ∈M ,
such that the modal validities for arithmetic potentialism over M , with respect to
assertions in the language of arithmetic using parameter u only, is exactly S4.
S4 = Val (M,L(M)) = Val (M,L(u)) ⊆ Val (M,L) ⊆ S5.
Proof. If parameters are allowed, we can carry out the previous argument in any
model of PA+, whether or not the universal sequence is empty in some model.
Simply let u be the length of the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm
in M , and consider the universal sequence as it might be extended beyond u. The
idea is that beyond u, we again have the tree of possibilities, and we can perform the
labeling of finite pre-trees as in theorem 30 by simply ignoring the first u terms of
the universal algorithm, leading to a new railyard assignment t 7→ rt overM , where
rt makes reference to parameter u. In this way, we will get Val (M,L(u)) = S4, as
desired. 
So we’ve seen how to ensure S4 for sentences in some models of arithmetic,
showing that the lower bound of theorem 29 is sharp. Let me now prove that the
upper bound is sharp, by finding a model of PA+ whose potentialist validities are
exactly S5.
A model of arithmetic M |= PA+ satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle,
if σ → σ is true in M for every arithmetic sentence σ. Thus, every sentence
that is possibly necessary overM is already true in M . In other words,M satisfies
the arithmetic maximality principle if and only if S5 is valid in M with respect
to sentences in the language of arithmetic. Since theorem 4 shows that σ is
equivalent to σ for arithmetic assertions σ, the arithmetic maximality principle
is equivalently formulated using either end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, and
in the next section we will see that it is also equivalently formulated using con-
servative end-extensions σ → σ or with computably saturated end-extensions
σ → σ, and others.
Since the arithmetic maximality principle is stated in terms of how a model M
relates to its extensions in the potentialist system of all models of arithmetic, it
might seem at first that it should be a property of the model, rather than merely
of the theory of the model. Nevertheless, the arithmetic maximality principle is
revealed by the theory of the model.
Theorem 32. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA+ under end-
extension, if a model M satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle and M ≡ N ,
then N also satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle.
Proof. IfM satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle, then in light of theorem 4,
this is visible is the theory of M as follows. Since the maximality principle asserts
σ → σ for every sentence σ, it is necessary and sufficient that if there is a
natural number n such that for all k the statement Con(PA+k + ¬Con(PA
+
n + ¬σ))
is in the theory, then σ is also in the theory. 
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Let me show that indeed there are models of the arithmetic maximality principle.
It turns out that these are simply the models satisfying a maximal Σ1 theory. A
maximal consistent Σ1 theory over PA
+ is a theory T consisting of Σ1 sentences
only, such that PA+ + T is consistent and T is maximal among such theories. In
particular, for such a theory T any Σ1 assertion that is consistent with PA
+ + T is
already an axiom of T . It is easy to construct such theories, simply by enumerating
all Σ1 assertions and then including them one at time, as long as this is consistent
over PA+. Indeed, every consistent Σ1 theory over PA
+ is contained in maximal
consistent Σ1 theory over PA
+.
Theorem 33. For any model of arithmetic M |= PA+, the following are equivalent.
(1) M fulfills the arithmetic maximality principle.
(2) The Σ1 theory of M is a maximal consistent Σ1 theory over PA
+.
These models M have potentialist validities described by
S4 = Val (M,L(M)) ( Val (M,L) = S5
Proof. Suppose a model of arithmetic M satisfies a maximal Σ1 theory over PA
+.
IfM |= σ, then there is an end-extension N |= PA+ satisfying σ, which means
that N |= ¬Con(PA+k + ¬σ) for some standard finite k by lemma 3. This is a Σ1
assertion that is true in N , where all the Σ1 assertions true in M remain true.
By maximality, therefore, this inconsistency statement must already be true in M .
This implies σ is necessary overM and in particularM |= σ, verifying this instance
of the maximality principle.
Conversely, if M satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle, then let me show
that the Σ1 theory of M is a maximal extension of PA
+. Suppose that σ is a Σ1
assertion that is consistent with PA+ plus the Σ1 theory of M . By lemma 2, this
implies M |= σ, and consequently M |= σ, since Σ1 assertions, once true, are
necessarily true in all further extensions. By the arithmetic maximality principle,
therefore, M |= σ, and so its Σ1 theory is maximal.
For the final statement of the theorem, note that we have already established that
Val(M,L(M)) = S4 for every model of arithmetic, and the arithmetic maximality
principle in M amounts precisely to Val(M,L) = S5. 
It may seem reasonable to expect that any given model of arithmetic M can be
extended so as to achieve a maximal Σ1 theory and therefore also the arithmetic
maximality principle. Perhaps one might hope, for example, to extend the model
one step at a time, making an additional Σ1 sentence true each time. Theorem 34
shows that this expectation is fine, if one seeks only to find an extension of the
original model, rather than an end-extension. But meanwhile, corollary 36 shows
that the expectation is wrong for end-extensions: some models of arithmetic have
no end-extension to a model with a maximal Σ1 theory and hence no end-extension
to a model of the arithmetic maximality principle.
Theorem 34. Every model of arithmetic M |= PA+ has an extension (not nec-
essarily an end-extension) to a model of arithmetic N |= PA+ with a maximal Σ1
theory, which therefore satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle.
Proof. Consider any model of arithmeticM |= PA+. Let T0 be the theory PA
+ plus
the atomic diagram of M . Enumerate the Σ1 sentences as σ0, σ1, σ2 and so on.
Build a new theory from T0 by adding σn at stage n, if this is consistent. Let T be
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the resulting theory. This is consistent, since it was consistent at each stage. So it
has a model N |= T , which can be taken as an extension of M since T includes the
atomic diagram of M . To see that the Σ1 theory of N is maximal, consider any Σ1
sentence σ, which is σn for some n and therefore considered at stage n of the theory
construction. If σ is not true in N , then it was not added to the theory T , and this
must have been because it was inconsistent with PA+ plus the atomic diagram of
M plus the earlier part of T . But whichever finite part of the atomic diagram that
was needed for the inconsistency amounts to a Σ1 statement that is true in M and
hence also in N . So we’ve proved that any Σ1 sentence that is consistent with the
Σ1 theory of N over PA
+ is already true in N , as desired. 
Theorem 35. Every model of the arithmetic maximality principle has the halting
problem 0′ in its standard system.
Proof. I shall give two arguments (with thanks to Roman Kossak and Volodya
Shavrukov for key suggestions). The first argument relies on a 1978 dissertation
result of Lessan (republished in [Les13]; see also [JE76] and [McA78, section 4]),
showing that for a nonstandard model of arithmetic M |= PA, the ∆0-definable
elements are co-initial in the standard cut of M if and only if the Π01 theory of the
standard model is not in the standard system ofM , or equivalently, if 0′ /∈ SSy(M).
Suppose thatM is a nonstandard model of arithmetic and 0′ is not in the standard
system of M . We claim that M is not a model of the arithmetic maximality
principle. By Lessan’s theorem, we know that the ∆0 definable elements of M are
coinitial in the standard cut of M . By overspill, we know that M |= Con(PA+k) for
some nonstandard k, and by making k smaller, if necessary, we may assume that k
is ∆0-definable in M and hence the output in M of some standard finite program
p on input 0; it suffices in this argument for k to be merely Σ1-definable. Consider
the assertion, “the number k which is the output of program p on input 0 satisfies
¬Con(PA+k).” This is a Σ1 sentence, which is not true inM , but could become true
in some end-extension of M , since by the incompleteness theorem we can always
end-extend any model of PA+ to make ¬Con(PA+k) for any nonstandard k. This is
a violation of the arithmetic maximality principle in M .
A second, alternative argument proceeds from a theorem of Adamowicz [Ada91]
(see also [ACFLM16, section 5]), which says that 0′ is Turing computable from any
maximal Σ1 theory. If a model of arithmetic M |= PA
+ satisfies the arithmetic
maximality principle, then its Σ1 theory is maximal over PA
+ and so 0′ must be in
the standard system of M . 
Because the existence of 0′ in the standard system is expressible in the extension
modality L by the method of theorem 7, perhaps it would be possible to use
Lessan’s or Adamowicz’s methods to answer question 12.
Corollary 36. Some models of arithmetic have no end-extension to a model of the
arithmetic maximality principle. Indeed, if 0′ is not in the standard system of M ,
then M has no end-extension to a model of the arithmetic maximality principle.
Proof. To see that some models of arithmetic lack 0′ in their standard systems,
consider the computable tree of attempts to build a complete consistent Henkin
theory extending PA+ plus the assertion that a new constant c is infinite (to ensure
that the model is nonstandard). It follows by the low basis theorem that there is
a low branch, and the Henkin model M arising from such a branch will have an
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elementary diagram of low complexity. It follows that every set in the standard
system of M will be low, and in particular, 0′ /∈ SSy(M). Since this is preserved to
end-extensions, such a model has no end-extension with the arithmetic maximality
principle by theorem 35. 
Volodya Shavrukov has pointed out in an email message to me that not having
an end-extension with the maximality principle is strictly stronger than omitting 0′
from the standard system, for he constructed a model of arithmetic M whose Σ1-
definable elements are coinitial in the standard cut, which ensures that there is no
end-extension of the maximality principle, yet 0′ is coded in M . This example also
shows that one cannot replace ∆0-definable in Lessan’s theorem with Σ1-definable.
Question 37. Can we characterize the models of arithmetic that admit an end-
extension to a model of the arithmetic maximality principle? In other words, which
models M have an end-extension to a model N with a maximal Σ1 theory?
The situation is reminiscent of the maximality principle for forcing (see [Ham03;
SV02]), which asserts that S5 is valid with respect to the forcing modality for
sentences in the language of set theory σ → σ, or in other words that every
forceably necessary statement σ is already true. The similarity is that while ZFC
plus this maximality principle is equiconsistent with ZFC, nevertheless [Ham03,
theorem 7] shows that it is not true that one can always force it over any model of
ZFC. Rather, a model of ZFC has a forcing extension realizing the forcing maxi-
mality principle if and only if it has a fully reflecting cardinal Vδ ≺ V .
2 Question 37
is asking essentially for the arithmetic analogue of this.
Although we have proved that the sentential validities Val (M,L) of a model of
arithmetic M are trapped between S4 and S5, with both of these endpoints being
realized, it is not clear exactly which modal theories can be realized.
Question 38. Which modal theories arise as the collection of sentential validities
Val (M,L) for a model of arithmetic M? For example, is there a model M realizing
exactly S4.2? or S4.3? Is this theory always a normal theory? And similarly for
Val (M,L) and the other extension modalities considered in this article, can they
be intermediate between S4 and S5?
Benedikt Lo¨we and I had asked a similar question in [HL08, questions 19,20]
concerning the modal logic of forcing. Alexander Block and I have recently answered
for that context by providing a model of set theory whose forcing validities are
strictly between S4.2 and S5. The key idea of that argument was to construct a
modelM with a ‘last’ button, that is, an unpushed button b such that (i) pushing b
overM necessarily pushes all other buttons; and (ii) pushing any unpushed button
over M pushes b. This seems unlikely in arithmetic, in light of the fundamental
tree-like structure revealed by the behavior of the universal algorithm.
Volodya Shavrukov has suggested that we might approach question 38 by con-
sidering whether there can be a model of arithmetic M whose Σ1 theory is not
2Note that this particular issue appears to be missed in [SV02], where [SV02, theorem 30]
claims, incorrectly, that one can always force the c.c.c. maximality principle, that is, without
using any reflecting cardinal, and similarly in the proofs of [SV02, theorem 27,31,37], which define
an iteration by inquiring at each stage whether a given statement, of arbitrary complexity, is
forceable; this is not possible without a truth predicate. These latter proofs can be repaired by
using the reflecting cardinal method as in [Ham03].
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maximal, but which nevertheless satisfies all the sentences that hold in every Σ1
maximal extension of M . Such a model would validate σ → σ for Σ1 sentences
σ, and one could then aim to validate ϕ → ϕ for all ϕ in the language of
arithmetic without validating S5.
6. Arithmetic potentialism for other modalities
Let me now extend the results of the previous section to the other arithmetic
potentialist modalities, such as , n and n, as well as the additional modalities
, and , which I shall introduce later in this section.
6.1. Arbitrary extensions. Let me begin with the modality of arbitrary exten-
sions, defined by
M |= ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in some extension of M, and
M |= ϕ if and only if ϕ holds in all extensions of M.
Much of the analysis of the end-extension modality applies to the case of arbitrary
extensions .
Theorem 39. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA+ under
the extension modality , the validities of any model M |= PA+, with respect to
arithmetic assertions allowing parameters from M , are exactly the assertions of
S4. Indeed, for every M there is u ∈M , the length of the universal finite sequence
in M , such that the validities of M , with respect to arithmetic assertions using
parameter u, are exactly S4.
S4 = Val (M,L(M)) = Val (M,L(u)) ⊆ Val (M,L) ⊆ S5.
Proof. The point is that the railyard labelings provided in the proofs of theorems 30
and 31 work also with the arbitrary extension modal operator . Suppose thatM is
any model of PA+ in which the universal algorithm enumerates the empty sequence,
and that T is a finite pre-tree. Let t 7→ rt be the railyard labeling of T described
in the proofs of theorems 30 and 31 (so rt may have parameter u, the length of
the universal finite sequence in M , if this is non-zero). Since the statements rt
were expressed in the language of arithmetic, it follows from lemma 2 that rt and
rt agree, and so this same labeling is a railyard labeling of T for the extension
modality just as much as for the end-extension modality. 
The bounds on Val (M,L) provided by theorem 39 are sharp, in the sense that
Val (M,L) = S5 in any model of the arithmetic maximality principle, since we have
observed that this is equivalently formulated using or ; and Val (M,L) = S4
in any model where the universal sequence is empty (or has standard finite length),
since then one doesn’t need the parameter u as it is absolutely definable.
The argument used in the proof of theorem 39 suggests but does not quite
establish that the modal validities for and , with respect to assertions in the
language of arithmetic, are the same in any model of arithmetic. So we’d like to
ask that now, a question that is closely related to question 8.
Question 40. If M |= PA+, then is Val (M,L) = Val (M,L)? More generally,
allowing parameters, is Val (M,L(A)) = Val (M,L(A)) for any collection of pa-
rameters A ⊆M?
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Either outcome would be extremely interesting, either a model whose validities
differed between and or a proof that they must always agree.
6.2. Σn-elementary extensions. Consider next the extension modalities n and
n, where we insist that the extensions are also Σn-elementary. Note the special
case = 0 and = 0, since every extension is Σ0-elementary.
Theorem 41. In either of the potentialist systems consisting of the models of
PA+ under Σn-elementary end-extensions n or under arbitrary Σn-elementary
extensions n, respectively, the potentialist validities of any model M |= PA
+, with
respect to assertions in the language of arithmetic allowing parameters from M , are
exactly the assertions of S4. Indeed, for every model M , there is a single parameter
u ∈ M , such that the potentialist validities over M , with respect to assertions in
the language of arithmetic using parameter u only, is exactly S4.
S4 = Val(M,L(M)) = Val(M,L(u)) ⊆ Val(M,L) ⊆ S5.
Proof. Consider any finite pre-tree T and let r 7→ rt be the railyard labeling of T
as in the proof of theorem 30, except using the oracle universal algorithm eˆ from
the proof of theorem 18. The parameter u is simply the length of this universal
finite sequence as computed in M . The algorithm uses oracle 0(n), as defined in
whichever model it is employed. Since the content of 0(n) is preserved and extended
by Σn-elementary extensions, it follows that the previous parts of the computation
remain the same as one moves to an accessible world. Thus, it follows just as earlier
that this is indeed a railyard labeling of T with respect to n and to n, and so
the validities for assertions in L(u) are contained within S4 as claimed. 
Consider next the arithmetic Σn-maximality principle, which holds in a model
M |= PA+ when the implication n n σ → σ holds there for every sentence σ
in the language of arithmetic. The analogues of lemmas 2 and 3 hold for Σn-
elementary extensions. Namely, a model of arithmetic M |= PA+ satisfies n ϕ(a)
for an arithmetic assertion ϕ just in case it satisfies Con(Trn+PA
+
k + ϕ(a)) for
every standard finite k, and this is also equivalent to n ϕ(a), and the proof is
just as in lemma 2, except that one includes the Σn diagram Trn of the model in
the theory, to ensure that the extension is Σn-elementary. For this reason, n ϕ
is equivalent to n ϕ for arithmetic assertions ϕ, and consequently the maximality
principle is equivalently formulated either as n n σ → σ, with end-extensions, or
as n n σ → σ, with arbitrary extensions.
Theorem 42. For any model of arithmetic M |= PA+ and any standard finite
natural number n, the following are equivalent.
(1) M fulfills the arithmetic Σn maximality principle.
(2) The Σn+1 theory of M is a maximal consistent Σn+1 theory over PA
+.
These models M have potentialist validities described by
S4 = Val (M,L(M)) ( Val (M,L) = S5
Proof. Suppose a model of arithmeticM satisfies a maximal Σn+1 theory over PA
+.
If M |= n n σ, then there is a Σn-elementary end-extension N |= PA
+ satisfying
n σ, which means that N |= ¬Con(Trn+PA
+
k +¬σ) for some standard finite k by
the Σn-elementary analogue of lemma 3. This is a Σn+1 assertion that is true in N ,
where all the Σn+1 assertions true inM remain true. By maximality, therefore, this
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inconsistency statement must already be true in M . This implies σ is n-necessary
over M and in particular M |= σ, verifying this instance of the Σn maximality
principle.
Conversely, if M satisfies the arithmetic Σn maximality principle, then let me
show that the Σn+1 theory of M is a maximal extension of PA
+. Suppose that σ
is a Σn+1 assertion that is consistent with PA
+ plus the Σn+1 theory of M . By
the Σn-elementary analogue of lemma 2, this implies M |= n σ, and consequently
M |= n n σ, since Σn+1 assertions, once true in a Σn-elementary extension, are
necessarily true in all Σn-elementary extensions. By the arithmetic Σn maximality
principle, therefore, M |= σ, and so its Σn+1 theory is maximal.
For the final statement of the theorem, note that we have already established
that Val
n
(M,L(M)) = S4 for every model of arithmetic, and the arithmetic Σn
maximality principle in M amounts precisely to Val
n
(M,L) = S5. 
6.3. Conservative and saturated extensions. Let me briefly introduce and
analyze the extension modalities and arising from conservative end-extensions
and computably saturated end-extensions, respectively.
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in a conservative end-extension of M,
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all conservative end-extensions of M,
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some computably saturated end-extension of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all computably saturated end-extensions of M.
An extension M ⊆ N is conservative, if whenever A ⊆ N is definable in N from
parameters in N , then A ∩M is definable in M using parameters in M . A model
M is computably saturated (also known formerly as recursively saturated), if every
computable 1-type overM , with finitely many parameters fromM , which is consis-
tent with the elementary diagram ofM , is realized inM . We shall usually consider
and only whenM itself is computably saturated (or the standard model), since
otherwise they trivialize. As a memory aid for the symbols, imagine that the con-
servative extension symbol resembles a collared white shirt and tie—conservative
attire—and the shaded-in part of suggests that all computable types over the
model are filled-in or realized.
The key observation to make concerning these new modalities is that many of
the arguments of the earlier sections of this paper, we built extensions of a model
of arithmetic M by taking the Henkin model of a certain theory that was definable
insideM . All such extensions N arising by this means will be conservative, because
any class that is definable in N is a class thatM has access to in virtue of its having
the entire elementary diagram of N . In particular, the universal algorithm result
of theorem 14 works with conservative extensions, and this will enable the key
arguments of the potentialist analysis to go through.
Theorem 43. For the conservative end-extension modality, with operators , :
(1) ϕ(a) is equivalent to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a) and to the other statements of
lemma 2, for arithmetic assertions ϕ.
(2) ϕ(a) is equivalent to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a) and to the other statements of
lemma 3, for arithmetic assertions ϕ.
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(3) The arithmetic maximality principal σ → σ is equivalently formulated
with conservative end-extensions as σ → σ.
(4) The universal algorithm of theorem 14 realizes its extension property with
respect to conservative end-extensions.
(5) For any model of arithmetic M |= PA+, the potentialist validities of the
conservative end-extension modality obey
S4 = Val (M,L(M)) = Val (M,L(u)) ⊆ Val (M,L) ⊆ S5.
(6) These bounds on Val (M,L) are sharp, in the sense that Val (M,L) = S4
in any model of arithmetic M |= PA+ in which the universal finite sequence
is empty or has standard finite length, and Val (M,L) = S5 in any model
M of the arithmetic maximality principle.
Proof. (1) Clearly ϕ(a) implies ϕ(a), because a conservative end-extension is an
end-extension. Conversely, if M |= ϕ(a), then by the proof of lemma 2, one can
realize ϕ(a) in an end-extension realized as the Henkin model of a theory definable
in M , and such an extension will be conservative over M . So M |= ϕ(a).
(2) This follows by duality from statement (1).
(3) This follows by the same argument as in theorem 4.
(4) The extension property of the universal algorithm was realized in the Henkin
model of definable theory in the model, which is therefore a conservative extension.
(5) This follows by the same argument as in theorems 30 and 31, using the fact
that the universal algorithm works with conservative extensions. The parameter u
here is the length of the universal finite sequence in M .
(6) This follows by the same argument as in theorem 33. 
Regarding the computably saturated end-extension modality , the key obser-
vation is that if a model of arithmeticM is computably saturated, then the models
N arising as Henkin models for theories in M will also be computably saturated,
since their elementary diagram is a definable class inM , and any model interpreted
in a computably saturated model is itself computably saturated. For this reason,
the analysis I have just given for conservative end-extensions carries through al-
most identically for the potentialist system consisting of the computably saturated
models of arithmetic under the end-extension modality , yielding:
Theorem 44. Concerning the computably saturated end-extension modality, with
operators and :
(1) ϕ(a) is equivalent, in a computably saturated model, to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a)
and to the other statements of lemma 2, for arithmetic assertions ϕ.
(2) ϕ(a) is equivalent, in a computably saturated model, to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a)
and to the other statements of lemma 3, for arithmetic assertions ϕ.
(3) The arithmetic maximality principal σ → σ is equivalently formulated,
in computably saturated models, with computably saturated end-extensions
as σ → σ.
(4) The universal algorithm of theorem 14 realizes its extension property, in
computably saturated models, with computably saturated end-extensions.
(5) For any computably saturated model of arithmetic M |= PA+, the potential-
ist validities of the computably saturated end-extension modality obey
S4 = Val (M,L(M)) = Val (M,L(u)) ⊆ Val (M,L) ⊆ S5.
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(6) These bounds on Val (M,L) are sharp, in the sense that Val (M,L) =
S4 in any computably saturated model of arithmetic M |= PA+ in which
the universal finite sequence is empty or has standard finite length, and
Val (M,L) = S5 in any computably saturated model M of the arithmetic
maximality principle.
A similar analysis can be carried out for the mixed modalities and other modal-
ities, below, and I invite the reader to explore these and other natural extension
modalities further.
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some conservative extension of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all conservative extensions of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some computably saturated extension of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all computably saturated extensions of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some c. saturated conservative end-extension of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all c. saturated conservative end-extensions of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some c. saturated conservative extension of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all c. saturated conservative extensions of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some extension with same standard system as M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all extensions with same standard system as M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some extension preserving a nonstandard cut of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all extensions preserving a nonstandard cut of M
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some c. saturated extension with same standard system
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all c. saturated extensions with same standard system
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in some c. saturated extension preserving a nonstandard cut
M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ holds in all c. saturated extensions preserving a nonstandard cut
Additional modalities arise by further restricting to Σn-elementary extensions,
such as 3 ϕ, which holds in a modelM when there is a Σ3-elementary conservative
computably saturated extension N in which ϕ holds, or 2 ϕ(a), which holds when
there is a computably saturated Σ2-elementary extension with the same standard
system in which ϕ(a) holds. We have a plethora of extension modalities here.
Basically, the situation is that almost all the analysis that I have given for the po-
tentialist validities, the universal algorithm and the maximality principle go through
in analogous form for these other extension modalities. Part of what is open is that,
although these modalities tend to agree on possibility ϕ(a) for arithmetic asser-
tions ϕ, I are not sure, as in question 8, to what extent the modalities agree on
the larger potentialist language (L). Theorem 7 shows that the validities do not
generally agree on the full potentialist language L , and that argument will extend
to several instances for these further mixed modalities, but perhaps some of them
do agree there.
It is also not clear for a given model M and A ⊆ M whether the validities
Val (M,L(A)) are the same for all the various modalities (assumeM is computably
saturated when considering the computably saturated modalities). Of course, in
some models they are, such as in the models of the arithmetic maximality principle,
or when A = M , since in these cases we get S5 and S4, respectively. But we are
lacking a fully general argument that these validities are always the same for the
various modalities.
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Question 45. Exactly to what extent are the potentialist validities of these various
arithmetic extension modalities the same?
This is an open-ended question, which would seem to admit many partial results
by considering merely some of the modalities. I invite the reader to join the project
and help sort out these various matters.
Volodya Shavrukov has mentioned that his article [Sha16], although it does not
mention modal logic explicitly, can be seen as concerned with the arithmetic po-
tentialism of nonstandard models of true arithmetic under arbitrary extensions
preserving a distinguished nonstandard element.
7. Philosophical remarks
Let me conclude with some philosophical remarks. This paper illustrates a com-
mon pattern of exchange between philosophy and mathematics, by which a philo-
sophical idea inspires a mathematical analysis, which in turn raises further philo-
sophical issues, and so on in a fruitful cycle. After all, the philosophy of potentialism
originates in antiquity in the classical dispute between actual and potential infinity,
and current work spans the range from philosophy to mathematics and back again.
Øystein Linnebo and Stewart Shapiro [Lin13; LS17] have emphasized the modal na-
ture of potentialism, viewing it as providing a hierarchy of universe fragments, which
therefore provide a natural context for modal assertions. In [HL17], Linnebo and I
developed a general model-theoretic account of potentialism and used it to find the
exact modal commitments of various kinds of set-theoretic potentialism, includ-
ing set-theoretic rank potentialism (true in all larger Vβ); Grothendieck-Zermelo
potentialism (true in all larger Vκ for inaccessible cardinals κ); transitive-set poten-
tialism (true in all larger transitive sets); countable-transitive-model potentialism
(true in all larger countable transitive models of ZFC); countable-model potential-
ism (true in all larger countable models of ZFC); and others. In [HL08], Lo¨we
and I found the modal validities of forcing potentialism. In [HW17], Woodin and
I found the modal validities of top-extensional set-theoretic potentialism. Visser
and Shavrukov [Vis98] found the validities of relative interpretability, including
arithmetic extension modalities, and in this article I similarly find the exact modal
commitments of various kinds of arithmetic potentialism.
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Figure 3. Differing potentialist conceptions
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So let me discuss a few philosophical issues I find to be raised by all this
mathematical analysis. A central feature now made plain is the fact that dif-
ferent potentialist systems can exhibit very different modal theories of validity.
The Grothendieck-Zermelo set-theoretic potentialism analyzed in [HL17], for ex-
ample, with universe fragments being the inaccessible rank-initial segments Vκ of
the set-theoretic universe, validates exactly S4.3; the forcing potentialism of [HL08]
validates exactly S4.2; and the top-extensional set-theoretic potentialism analyzed
in [HW17] validates exactly S4.
These different modal theories are the direct result of the fundamentally different
character of potentiality offered by these various potentialist systems. One generally
has S4.3 in a potentialist system when the worlds are linearly ordered; S4.2 when
they are directed; and S4 when they have the character of a tree, with branching
possibility. (But please remember that lower bounds are cheap; to establish these
theories as upper bounds, in contrast, is often a subtler matter.)
The philosophical point to be made is that in order to be satisfactory, an account
of potentialism must address these fundamentally different kinds of potentiality.
The naive potentialist account of arithmetic potentialism—the view that one has
at any moment only some or boundedly many of the natural numbers, but one
can always have more as time proceeds—is no longer sufficient, because it doesn’t
address the critical issue of branching possibility. Are we to expect the universe as
it unfolds to have a character of linear inevitability, where the numbers pile on in a
unique coherent manner, converging to a final model? Or shall we expect the un-
expected, with the universe unfolding in a process of radical branching possibility?
These notions of potentiality have fundamentally different characters.
Indeed, I should like to argue that the convergent forms of potentialism are much
closer to actualism than are the more radically potentialist theories, and I regard
convergent potentialism as implicitly actualist. The reason is that if the universe
fragments of one’s potentialist system are mutually coherent with one another,
forming a coherent system in the sense of [HL17], then there is a unique limit model
to which the system is converging, and there seems to be very little at stake in the
ontological dispute concerning the actual existence of this limit model. What does
it matter if the potential objects that might come to exist do not yet actually exist,
if the way that they will come to exist is unique and deterministic? To experience
potentiality in convergent potentialism is simply to wait for the inevitable. In
a convergent potentialist system, after all, the potentialist can refer to truth in
the limit model, without having that model in his or her ontology, by means of
the potentialist translation: one translates existence assertions ∃x for the limit
model as ∃x for the universe fragments (see [HL17, theorem 1] and also [Lin13];
a similar idea underlies theorem 10 in this article). For convergent potentialism,
therefore, it is as though the limit model actually exists, for all the purposes of
speaking about what is true or false there. But it is not just about making truth
and falsity assertions for the limit model; rather, with convergent potentialism,
it is that the limit model has an implicit existence whose fundamental nature is
determined by and definable in the potentialist system, for we can interpret the
full actualist universe inside the potentialist ontology. This is the sense in which I
regard convergent potentialism as implicitly actualist. In convergent potentialism,
the full actual limit universe supervenes on the potentialist ontology.
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A more radical form of potentialism, in contrast, arises when there is truly
branching possibility, statements that could become true, but might not. For this
kind of potentialism, one is living in a universe fragment, and the question of what
might become true and verified in a larger universe fragment depends on precisely
how the universe unfolds. Will the next number on the universal finite sequence be
even or odd? Will the Rosser sentence be true or its negation? It depends on how
the universe unfolds.
Woodin [Woo11] uses this feature explicitly to make a point about free will and
determinism. Suppose I fix the universal algorithm of theorem 14 and announce
that it will predict your free-will choices. Am I wrong? You freely choose a finite
sequence of numbers, any sequence at all, and we run the program. If time is ex-
tended into the right universe, my program will correctly enumerate your sequence
there, fulfilling my claim of it as a predictor. And we can do it again from that
point, as much as we want: you freely pick a finite extension of the sequence, and
in the right extension of the universe, the predictor will again be right.
I believe that end-extensional arithmetic potentialism can shed light on the phi-
losophy of finitism and even ultrafinitism. To be sure, I do not expect to engage the
ultrafinitist in an analysis of nonstandard models of arithmetic, since such models
and even the standard model of arithmetic do not have a real mathematical exis-
tence for the ultrafinitist. Rather, what I am proposing is to use the potentialist
system in order to shed light on what are the commitments of ultrafinitism, for it is
often not as clear as one might hope to come to an understanding of exactly what
ultrafinitism is. This is an analysis of ultrafinitism undertaken by and for the actu-
alists, to help them understand ultrafinitism, much as one might use classical logic
when analyzing or comparing the power of various systems of intuitionist logic.
The main point is that important features of the potentialist system appear to
be shared with assertions that one sometimes hears from ultrafinitists. For the
ultrafinitist, the universe of natural numbers starts out perfectly clear with the
numbers 0, 1, 2 and so on, but as time proceeds there is increasing hesitancy
concerning extremely large numbers; it is as though the numbers get less definite
as one proceeds; one can often describe much larger numbers with a comparatively
small definition, but the number being defined would be so vast that the ultrafinitist
is hesitant to agree that it actually exists. Thus, the ultrafinitist appears to have
something like an initial segment of the universe of natural numbers, a realm of
feasibility. Perhaps this realm is even closed under successor, or perhaps not, but
many ultrafinitists are reluctant to assert that there is a largest natural number,
and it is because of this kind of issue that it is often difficult to say exactly what it
is that the ultrafinitist holds.
My idea is that every model of arithmetic M can be seen as providing an ultra-
finitistic context, a realm of feasibility, with respect to its end-extensions N , in that
the objects of M are smaller in a very robust way than the additional objects of
N , yet still they obey inM the attractive and familiar mathematical properties. In
particular, since M is closed under successor and the other elementary arithmetic
operations (but definitely not necessarily under all arithmetically definable opera-
tions in N), what we gain is a robust, coherent and mathematically precise way of
understanding the nature of ultrafinitist worlds. On this account, the finitist and
ultrafinitist perspective is that the full entirety of the natural numbers is so vast
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that it has these difficult-to-describe cuts corresponding to partial universe frag-
ments, which are closed under successor and much more, but which can be viewed
as a lower realm of feasibility. Thus, one doesn’t view the nonstandard models as
enlargements of the ‘standard’ model, but rather one views them as ultrafinitist
approximations of the full model of natural numbers yet to be constructed on top.
The view is not that the finitist or the ultrafinitist are speaking about nonstan-
dard models of PA, which of course they are not. Rather, the view is that the
situation arising from the potentialist account of these models seems to exhibit
many of the features concerning arithmetic and the nature of arithmetic truth and
number existence assertions that the finitist and the ultrafinitist seem to describe,
and for this reason by studying the nature of the potentialist system, we might
come to a better understanding of those views.
Thus, I propose to view the philosophy of ultrafinitism in modal terms as a form
of potentialism. For this kind of ultrafinitism, we would have a hierarchy of realms of
feasibility, about which we could make modal assertions connecting them. Further,
this picture leads directly to the question of branching possibility in ultrafinitism,
and we would thus seem to have distinct varieties of ultrafinitism, depending on
how one answers. Is it part of the ultrafinitist ontology or not that the nature of
the numbers, as we produce more and more of them, are determinate with linear
inevitability? Or might we discover different arithmetic truths if the numbers are
revealed differently? Linear inevitability ultrafinitism would have modal validities
S4.3, but would, as I argued above, be much closer to non-ultrafinitist positions
concerning the limit model. Radical branching ultrafinitism, in contrast, would
exhibit true branching possibility as the realms of feasibility unfold, validating only
S4.
The potentialist version of ultrafinitism need not necessarily be arithmetic end-
extensional potentialism, for one can imagine that the ultrafinitist realms of fea-
sibility do not necessarily constitute an initial segment of the larger realms. For
example, it is conceivable that a modal ultrafinitist could hold that 22
100
comes
into existence at an earlier stage of feasibility than some of the numbers smaller
than it, simply because it is easier to describe this number—it has low Kolmogorov
complexity—than some of the numbers smaller than it, which can have enormous
complexity or an effectively random nature, say, for their digits.
Turning now to another philosophical topic, logically inclined mathematicians
sometimes inquire: if a theory is inconsistent, but there is no short proof of a
contradiction from the theory, can one still rely on it when using only short proofs?
The potentialist framework provides an interesting take on this, for one can imagine
that a theory is consistent in a universe fragment, but potentially inconsistent only
in a larger fragment. Indeed, this phenomenon is fundamental to the proof of the
universal algorithm, since if stage n of that algorithm is successful, then PAkn−1
is consistent in that model, but it can become inconsistent in an end-extension.
The smaller world can usefully build a model of a theory, even though the larger
model cannot really do this sensibly, when the theory becomes inconsistent. In this
sense, the smaller universe fragments actually have access to a broader number of
possible worlds; they haven’t yet been closed off by selecting a particular universe
extension. Such a perspective allows one to look upon paraconsistency through a
potentialist lens, which provides in effect a hierarchy of realms of consistency and
thereby controls logical explosion.
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Finally, let me briefly discuss how arithmetic potentialism relates to the interpre-
tation of Maddy’s MAXIMIZE principle [Mad97] in arithmetic foundations. Maddy
directs us by her maxim to adopt foundational theories that maximize the range
of mathematical possibility. A straightforward interpretation of this in arithmetic
would seem to lead us to models of the arithmetic maximality principle, where ev-
ery sentence σ that could become necessarily true is already true. By theorem 33,
these are precisely the models exhibiting a maximal Σ1 arithmetic theory, making
a maximal assertion of existence in arithmetic. The problem for Maddy, however,
is that all such theories necessarily make numerous inconsistency assertions. In
particular, they all think ¬Con(PA) and much more. Since they have maximized
the collection of sentences σ for which σ holds, they have also maximized the col-
lection of true sentences σ for which PAk +¬σ is inconsistent. But Maddy doesn’t
usually seem to take her MAXIMIZE principle to compel one towards holding that
most mathematical theories are inconsistent.
Maddy, of course, is implementing her principle in set theory, rather than arith-
metic, and she proposes it as a principled way to justify various large cardinal
axioms. The point I make here is that adding new large cardinal axioms in set
theory leads usually to the negation of Σ01 statements, since they cause consistency
statements to become true rather than inconsistency statements. So perhaps the
large-cardinal set-theorist reply is that we should be minimizing the Σ01 theory, or
in other words, maximizing the Π01 theory. This makes sense if one thinks that
having a shorter model of arithmetic is better: it is closer to being standard.
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